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ABSTRACT 
 
A common problem in intelligent-agent-based systems is 
that of cooperation.  It is imperative that such systems 
can reliably determine which agents may be safely 
engaged with, and which should be avoided. We present 
an analysis framework in which the trustworthiness of 
potential partners is determined based on their ability to 
corrupt the agent. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A common goal of Artificial Intelligence research is the 
development of intelligent agents [1] that can 
independently perform one or more useful tasks, such as 
remote exploration or news gathering for example. 
Many intelligent agents perform a simple information 
gathering service; for example, trawling the web for 
related information and collating the results.  As the 
technology improves, though, many agents are being 
entrusted with purchasing decisions, for example in 
online shopping.  It is not unreasonable to expect many 
online transactions in the future to be accomplished 
between intelligent agents.  An orthogonal point is that 
many agents are mobile; that is, they may migrate to a 
different execution platform, either to distribute 
computational load or perhaps for increased access to 
local information. 
As this area develops, and as the complexity of the tasks 
performed by independent agents increases, these tasks 
will increasingly be performed in cooperation with other 
intelligent agents, each with their own specialized area 
of expertise.  Unfortunately, this cooperation is open to 
abuse, and as the responsibilities accorded to such 
intelligent agents increases the risks are magnified. 
We are concerned that, particularly with the economic 
risks inherent, without a solid framework on which 
intelligent agents can base decisions on whether to 
cooperate or not this promising technology may face 
stiff opposition.  We identify two types of risk, and 
present an approach to verifying interactions based on 
their ability to introduce corrupted data (directly or 
indirectly).  
2. MOTIVATION 
We focus on software-based intelligent agents (that is, 
mobile code, rather than, say, remote exploration 
vehicles), however it should be noted that the analysis 
framework is sufficiently general to be extended in other 
directions as well. 
2.1. PROBLEM DOMAIN 
As a basis for analysis, we assume a system in which 
communication amongst intelligent agents occurs along 
named channels (corresponding, for example, to a socket 
or shared memory), and in which agents may migrate 
(obvious in the case of physical agents; otherwise 
corresponding to mobile code, such as Java applets).  We 
further assume that networks of communication are not 
fixed; they may dynamically reconfigure themselves by 
transmitting the name or address of links to other 
intelligent agents.  The ad-hoc nature of such networks 
makes the analysis more complicated, but is also more 
realistic and flexible. 
These assumptions are captured in the pi-calculus [2]; a 
core modelling language usually used in programming 
language research, but that has also been applied to 
fields such as business process modelling [3].  In 
particular, we use a variant adapted to allow higher-order 
analysis (that is, mobile code) [4]. 
2.2. CORRUPTED COMMUNICATION LINKS 
Under the analysis framework just suggested, the most 
immediate danger is of a corrupted communication 
channel.  By “corrupted”, we assume a path which 
cannot guarantee the integrity of data transmitted along 
it, with no means of determining if this has happened or 
not.  This may be as a result of “noise” on the channel, 
or it may be due to the deliberate corruption of data or 
the injection of false values by a malicious third-party. 
There is a second possibility, which we will also 
consider: the data may have become corrupted, but the 
agent is capable of determining (on a case-by-case basis) 
when this has occurred, due to digital signatures, error-
detecting codes, or the like.  In this case the channel is 
neither corrupted nor completely secure; it lies in the 
middle ground. 
Note that there is some subtlety that must be considered 
here: it is perhaps easy to avoid the use of corrupted 
channels in a fixed setting, but extra care must be taken 
in the presence of ad-hoc networks where it may be 
difficult to determine if a new link the agent has just 
obtained is trustworthy or not. 
2.3. MALICIOUS AGENTS 
A more subtly pernicious problem arises when 
considering the impact of interaction with “rogue” 
intelligent agents.  At first glance this looks relatively 
simple: any data received from an agent known to be 
untrustworthy should be rejected.  Closer examination, 
however, reveals a serious complication. 
Consider the case of interaction with a single intelligent 
agent, assumed to be trustworthy, but one that 
accomplishes its tasks in cooperation with others.  If the 
secondary agent is malicious, it may conceivably pass 
corrupted information along to our agent, via the first.  
In this case, we must also distrust the first agent. 
A related problem exists when considering how to treat a 
collection of intelligent agents (for example, sharing the 
same virtual machine).  If there is a particular agent 
known to be malicious, but that is isolated from 
communication with the others in the collection, then it 
should have no impact when determining the 
trustworthiness of the group. 
The question arises as to how an agent may initially be 
considered untrustworthy.  We identify two particular 
routes.  The first is due to the possibility of agent 
migration: if an intelligent agent is transported, via a 
corrupted communication channel, from one machine to 
execute on another then the agent in question must be 
considered untrustworthy due to the possibility it has 
been replaced with a malicious agent in transit.  A 
second route may occur due to an agent’s history: a bad 
experience with a particular intelligent agent would 
logically lead an agent to distrust that agent from then on 
(we do not consider this route formally; we merely 
assume that our intelligent agent knows some agents to 
be trustworthy and others not to be — the programmer 
of a particular agent may also introduce this initial 
information) 
2.4. APPROACH 
As stated previously, we use the pi-calculus as a 
modeling language for our analysis.  We structure our 
analysis as a system of type annotations; the 
determination of the integrity of a potential partner agent 
then becomes a task of type inference.  The type 
annotations themselves are based on a Boolean algebra, 
which enables expressive and complicated networks of 
dependency to be easily encoded. This also enables us to 
cheaply benefit from the many existing results in the 
area. 
2.5. PAPER STRUCTURE 
The paper is structured as follows.  In section 3 we 
introduce the modelling language used, with a brief 
introduction of the basic type system.  We then proceed 
in section 4 to present an overview of our approach.  In 
section 5 we briefly review some related work, then in 
section 6 we conclude. 
3. MODELLING LANGUAGE 
In order to facilitate a formal analysis of the domain, we 
choose to encode interactions amongst intelligent agents 
using a well-understood process calculus; specifically, 
the pi-calculus [2]. 
 
3.1. THE PI-CALCULUS 
The pi calculus was first presented by Milner in 1989, as 
a means of reasoning about concurrent computation, 
based on the primitive of communication of names.  It 
has proven sufficiently abstract and powerful, however, 
that it has now been applied to other domains such as 
business process modelling [3].  Sangiorgi [4] later 
described a variant that enabled communication of 
processes as well as names.  It was also shown that the 
higher-order calculus could be encoded in the first-order, 
however the natural expressivity of the higher-order pi-
calculus sees it enjoy wide usage.  We use it to model 
intelligent agent interactions; agents are modelled as 
processes, and communication between intelligent 
agents is modelled naturally using the pi-calculus 
primitives. 
The core primitive of the pi-calculus is communication.  
Communication occurs along named channels (such as 
sockets or shared memory).  In its pure form, all data 
objects are channel names (thus new links can be 
established by sending the name of a new channel), 
although it is a small stretch from there to also include 
primitives such as integers. 
3.1.1. EXAMPLES 
We will first introduce the language via some illustrative 
examples. 
As a first example, consider the simple case of an 
intelligent agent running in parallel (that is, in the same 
environment) with a second: this is expressed concisely 
with the “composition” operator, the vertical bar: 
agent1 | agent2  
Secondly, as an introduction to cooperation, consider an 
agent sending a single value — the number 3 — to a 
second agent.  Letting the name of the communication 
channel be x, and the variable to which 3 will be bound 
(effectively, the formal parameter) be called y, then this 
situation is represented as follows: 
x 3[ ].agent1 | x y( ).agent2 
This then reduces, in a single step, to: 
agent1 | agent2 3 y{ } 
The notation agent 3 y{ } denotes agent  with every 
free instance of y replaced by 3. 
Finally, we provide an example demonstrating the 
descriptive potential of the language for expressing 
cooperation amongst intelligent agents. 
Assume an agent agent1 that needs some information 
from the agent server  but doesn’t have the necessary 
address.  It does, however, have the address of a 
cooperative agent called agent2  which is aware of the 
server’s address.  We might express this as follows: 
p z( ).z y( ).agent1 | p x[ ].agent2 | x 3[ ].server  
The agents may then cooperate to achieve their goal.  
First, agent1 receives the address of server  from 
agent2  (along their shared communication channel p ), 
resulting in the following arrangement: 
x y( ).agent1 | agent2 | x 3[ ].server  
Then, as in an earlier example, agent1 — now that is 
has the server’s address in its possession — may receive 
the desired information from the server: 
agent1 3 y{ } | agent2 | server  
(For simplicity, this example assumes that the variable z  
doesn’t occur anywhere else in agent1).  It is this 
natural ability to describe ad-hoc, re-configurable 
networks of communication that give the pi-calculus its 
appeal in situations involving cooperation. 
3.2. THE HIGHER-ORDER PI-CALCULUS 
It is a simple conceptual jump to go from transmitting 
primitive data types, to transmitting code.  The only 
changes we must make are to allow processes to be 
transmitted (that is, admit processes in an output clause 
in the syntax), and to introduce variables that may be 
bound to processes (as it is necessary to distinguish 
between intelligent agents and channels of 
communication). 
We now present the complete syntax (Figure 1).  In the 
following, intelligent agents (processes) are represented 
by P  and Q, channel names are represented by x , and 
agent variables by X .  The option of either name or 
variable is ranged over by V , and the option of name or 
agent by K .  The vector notation V  denotes a sequence 
of zero or more names or variables V1...Vn  (the same 
notation is also used to describe sequences of names, 
processes, and so on). 
P ::= 0 | P | Q | P +Q | !P | νV( )P
| x V( ).P | x K[ ].P | X
Figure 1: Language Syntax 
A brief explanation follows; for more details the reader 
is referred to Sangiorgi [4].  All (non-variable) agents 
are composed on top of the inactive process 0.  As 
mentioned previously, P | Q  represents an agent P  
executing in parallel with an agent Q  (the language does 
not specify location in any way; they may be two threads 
on the same virtual machine, or completely independent 
agents on opposite sides of the world).  The summation 
construct P +Q describes the non-deterministic choice 
between P  and Q; it is typically used to encode 
branching (although technically non-deterministic, the 
decision usually boils down to which has prior 
opportunity to execute).  Replication is expressed as !P , 
describing forking (it may be defined recursively as 
P |!P ).  The construct νV( )P  is used to introduce the 
fresh name or variable V  in the scope of P .  Input is 
written as x V( ).P  which inputs data (including other 
processes) along the channel x  and binds them to the 
variables (formal parameters, in effect) V  in the agent 
P . Output is similarly written as x K[ ].P , with a bar 
over the top of the channel name and square brackets 
around the outputs in order to easily distinguish between 
input and output constructs. 
Due to space limitations, we will focus our attention on 
the core constructions of parallel execution and 
communication (input and output).  For further details, 
the reader is referred to [5] and [6]. 
3.3. TYPE SYSTEMS 
Type systems are generally designed to prevent certain 
kinds of run-time error from occurring, such as 
instantiation of variables to values of an incorrect type.  
The most immediately obvious form of run-time error in 
the pi calculus is arity errors on channels: for example, 
sending a pair of values to an agent expecting only one.  
So, our type system must prevent these errors from 
occurring. This could be achieved by associating an 
integer (indicating the channel arity) with each channel 
name.  It soon becomes apparent, however, that we must 
also concern ourselves with the types of the data 
transmitted.  That is, for example, we must distinguish 
between transmission of a single name used to carry a 
single argument, and of a single name used to carry three 
at a time.  In a higher-order calculus we must also 
distinguish between a variable that may be bound to a 
name, and a variable that may be bound to an agent. 
We begin by specifying a type for a communication 
channel as a sequence of types.  For example, if the 
channel x  may carry integer pairs we may assign it the 
type int int( ).  The process that outputs the name x  
and the number 3 then exits, written y x 3[ ].0 , is only 
well typed (assuming x  has the type above) if y  has the 
type int int( ) int( ).  The type of a process (intelligent 
agent) is written with square brackets to differentiate it 
from a channel type.  For example, we would write the 
following to specify that the process just discussed was 
well typed: 
y x 3[ ].0 :[] 
For simplicity, we do not consider recursive types. 
4. INFERRING TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Our analysis framework takes the form of an annotated 
type system, in which the annotations convey the 
information regarding trustworthiness.  An intelligent 
agent, before engaging in cooperation with a given 
potential partner agent, should first perform a type-
deduction on the model of the system to determine the 
overall trustworthiness of the potential interaction. 
4.1. TRUST ANNOTATIONS 
We annotate the basic type system as mentioned in 
section 3.3 with additional attributes conveying 
information about the integrity or trustworthiness of a 
particular name or intelligent agent.  These annotations 
are modelled on a Boolean algebra, facilitating the reuse 
of existing results (such as unification algorithms, for 
example). 
We let trusted types be tagged with the symbol T , and 
untrusted with U , with variables ranged over by i  and 
j .  With annotation expressions ranged over by b, the 
usual operations of conjunction, disjunction, and 
negation are defined as expected: 
U ⋅ b =U T ⋅ b = b ˆ T =U
U + b = b T + b = T ˆ U = T
 
Figure 2: Type Annotations 
We also define the ordering U ≤ b ≤ T . 
4.2. CORE TYPE RULES 
When determining the trustworthiness of a network of 
intelligent agents, it is our contention that a judgement 
can only be made from a given perspective.  In our case, 
this perspective is the set of ports through which our 
agent can communicate: if an untrustworthy intelligent 
agent can gain access to one of these ports, the network 
must be treated as untrustworthy.  In order to represent 
this perspective, we carry a constant set of information 
throughout the deduction: the set of names that form the 
agent’s view into the network.  Any determination of the 
combined trustworthiness of a network is then done 
relative to this context. 
A complete deduction actually consists of two steps.  
The first is the regular application of all the type rules.  
The second is an application of a special type rule — 
which is always the final rule in a deduction — which 
calculates the trustworthiness of the network relative to 
our agent’s perspective. 
In order to do this calculation, it is necessary to collect 
some additional information during the deduction.  We 
refer to this as the execution context: it is a set of channel 
names, associated with the trustworthiness of the 
intelligent agents that are known to use that name.  Thus, 
if the execution context for a particular network of 
intelligent agents contains the mapping x : T , we can 
guarantee that only trustworthy agents will use it and 
thus our intelligent agent (performing the deduction) 
may safely communicate along the channel x .  
Alternatively, if the execution context contained the 
mapping x :U  then any intelligent agent using it is 
potentially introducing corrupted information, so our 
agent should avoid the use of the channel x . 
As remarked earlier, we will only discuss the core cases 
of parallel execution and communication.  For all details 
(including formal presentation and all auxiliary results), 
the reader is referred to [5]. 
4.2.1. PARALLEL EXECUTION 
With the case of parallel execution of intelligent agents, 
the main quandary is what the overall trustworthiness 
should be.  If we consider two agents, one considered 
trustworthy but the other known not to be, what should 
the combination be?  The safe choice is to say 
‘untrustworthy’ (that is, the lowest common 
denominator; note that this may be achieved by 
multiplying their annotations, as in Figure 2).  This 
choice, however, is overly restrictive if the 
untrustworthy intelligent agent is unable to interfere 
either with the trustworthy agent or our own intelligent 
agent.  The actual type rule is as follows: 
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In the above, Γ  and Θ are type environments (mapping 
channel names to types), E  is out intelligent agent’s 
interface (the set of names through which it 
communicates; it is a constant through the deduction), 
CP  is the execution context of the agent P  (and 
likewise CQ ), and the final annotation d  is the product 
(as calculated through the rules in Figure 2) of the 
mappings — contained in the execution contexts — of 
all the names in the intelligent agent’s interface E .  
This means that if there is any name used by both our 
agent and an untrustworthy agent under examination, 
then the entire network must be considered 
untrustworthy.  Likewise, however, there may be an 
untrustworthy agent in the deduction, but if it has no 
avenue of communication with our agent then the 
network may still safely be considered trusted — as 
desired in our intuitions. 
The rules for communication are considerably more 
complicated (at least notationally, if not conceptually) 
and we thus restrict ourselves to an informal overview, 
rather than a formal presentation. 
4.2.2. INPUT 
Firstly, consider the case of inputting data along a given 
channel.  Our primary requirement is that untrustworthy 
data is never bound to a trusted variable. Conversely, 
however, it seems logical that we may safely bind a 
trusted input to an untrustworthy variable (with the only 
consequence being that a formerly trusted value is now 
treated with suspicion).  This corresponds to a notion of 
sub-typing, where a trusted type is a sub-type of an 
untrustworthy type, and is relatively easily expressed.  
Our second major requirement is that data received from 
an untrusted channel must obviously itself be considered 
corrupted (the converse is not true; a secure channel may 
be used to transport corrupted values).  We achieve this 
by requiring that the annotation of all input values be 
multiplied (see the rules of Figure 2) by the annotation of 
the channel itself (as ‘trustworthy’ corresponds to the 
multiplicative identity). 
There is a further subtlety that must be considered, 
however, that is not so immediately obvious.  We must 
require that all parameters to the input occur in a context 
(as expressed by the mapping in the agent’s execution 
context) that is at least as trustworthy as the agent’s 
current trustworthiness.  The rationale behind this is 
essentially to prevent a trusted process acquiring a name 
used by another process in an untrusted context, and thus 
becoming untrustworthy (obviously not a desirable 
result; see section 4.3). 
4.2.3. OUTPUT 
Our output rule is similar in concept.  We require the 
type of the values carried by the channel to be multiplied 
by the annotation of the channel, as with the input case.  
For the output rule, however, we reason that it should be 
possible to send a trusted value along an untrustworthy 
channel — it will merely be considered untrustworthy by 
the receiving agent, due to the input rule.  This is 
similarly accomplished using a sub-typing clause, but 
the in opposite direction to the input rule (that is, the 
sub-type clause is covariant in the output case; 
corresponding to the well-known result in function sub-
typing). 
4.3. DEFINING TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Space concerns dictate that we cannot include all the 
formal results, in particular the many auxiliary results 
required, however we sketch the main security results. 
The first important result is a statement of subject 
reduction; in other words, that types are preserved under 
reduction.  This states that a network of intelligent 
agents, deduced to have a certain trustworthiness, will 
have exactly the same trustworthiness after executing a 
few steps.  This is an important result as it establishes 
the sanity of the type rules: a network of agents deduced 
to be trusted can be guaranteed not to evolve into a 
network that would be considered untrustworthy. 
On top of this basis are built two security results. 
The first is a guarantee of data integrity: it states that 
agents will not use untrustworthy data in a computation 
demanding a trusted input.  It is couched in terms of an 
observability property: briefly, that an intelligent agent 
built solely out of trusted data will never receive 
untrustworthy inputs. 
Finally, we can state what is guaranteed by the 
determination of the trustworthiness of a network of 
intelligent agents.  The main security result states that a 
network of agents, determined to be trusted from a 
particular perspective (that is, with respect to a limited 
set of communication ports), will never evolve into a 
network such that an untrustworthy intelligent agent may 
communicate with any of those ports.  Thus, a malicious 
agent may run in a sandbox (isolated from 
communication) and be considered trusted, but if there is 
any potential for a malicious agent to communicate 
through that set of ports, even through a naïve third-
party intelligent agent, then the entire network must be 
considered as malicious. 
4.4. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have designed a type inference algorithm that is 
capable of finding the most general type for a given set 
of intelligent agents (and thus, how trustworthy they may 
be from a given perspective). 
While there is insufficient space to present the full 
algorithm, its operation is relatively simple.  It basically 
walks backwards through the deduction tree for the 
given collection of agents, applying the type rules in 
reverse as it does so.  Unknown types and annotations 
are assigned variables, which are unified with other 
types / annotations if required to match by the type rule 
in operation.  If a rule includes a sub-typing clause, then 
fresh variables are generated and constraints collected.  
These constraints may be solved on completion of the 
inference process. 
It is noted that this algorithm, in the absence of other 
information, will generate a type that is expressed in 
terms of variables.  As our results prove that this type is 
the most general (that is, any valid type for the system 
may be derived by variable substitution), it is a simple 
matter to reason about the potential interaction by 
evaluating the type with different values for the 
variables. 
5. RELATED WORK 
The work presented here essentially boils down to 
integrity analysis, in a concurrent and ad-hoc setting.  
While work in the area of integrity analysis is 
surprisingly scarce, it has been observed that integrity 
analysis is in fact dual to secrecy analysis — on which 
there is a great body of research. 
Work on secrecy analysis using the higher-order pi-
calculus is limited, however similar goals have been 
investigated in [7].  Work on security (secrecy) using the 
ambient calculus (a process calculus designed to express 
locality and mobility) has been undertaken in [8]. 
An analysis using distributed notions of trust for the 
purposes of authentication was presented in [9].  An 
analysis of trust in agent-based systems, based on past 
behaviour of other agents, was presented in [10] (they do 
not consider the integrity of the cooperation however). 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented an overview of a formal method for 
guaranteeing safe interactions amongst intelligent 
agents, based on attacks from known malicious agents or 
from data being corrupted during transmission.  It allows 
an intelligent agent to decide whether or not to 
commence cooperation with a network of agents, even if 
the complexity and ad-hoc nature of the network makes 
a simple determination impossible.  The analysis is 
based on an annotated type system, using the higher-
order pi-calculus as the modelling language. 
6.1. FUTURE WORK 
The system as it currently stands assumes a “white box” 
model; that is, it is assumed that the source code of 
collaborating intelligent agents is known.  This needs to 
be extended to handle agents of unknown construction 
before it may be widely deployed. 
Another area for improvement is in the deduction 
process: currently, if the interface of the intelligent agent 
performing the deduction changes (for example, by 
opening another port for communication) the entire 
deduction must be repeated.  It would be desirable to 
improve on this so that the deduction is expressed as a 
function of the interface exposed, and the function 
merely recomputed if the interface is changed. 
It would also be worth investigating other process 
calculi.  The pi-calculus has proven well suited for 
describing cooperation between intelligent agents, 
however it is fundamentally incapable of describing 
agent locality, which may be an important factor to 
consider (for example, the situation of an agent 
migrating across a firewall to interact with another agent 
is difficult to express in the pi-calculus).  Other 
languages specifically designed to express locality, such 
as the ambient calculus [11] may prove more suitable for 
this task.  Further investigation is required however. 
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